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The rise of China and the turbulence in U.S. domestic politics have created great disorder, but they have also opened up room for creative Indian diplomacy in Asia.
The risk of an inadvertent nuclear war is rising because of the entanglement of non-nuclear weapons with nuclear weapons and their command-and-control capabilities.
The gap between the Chinese and U.S. views on North Korea is too deep and fundamental, and any illusion it can be bridged in a relatively short period of time will only set the two powers on a path to collision with each other.
Dialogue in various formats—bilateral, trilateral, and multilateral—will not eliminate some fundamentally conflicting views and the misalignment of perceived national interests among China, Japan, and the United States, but it can help to reduce the risk and the cost of ill-advised defense investments.
If President Donald Trump wants to make his upcoming Beijing summit meeting with President Xi Jinping successful, it is time to take a step back and reflect on his overall approach to solicit China’s cooperation.
This book identifies how Asia’s major powers have developed military strategies to address their most significant challenges.
The future of the U.S.-China relationship depends largely on the relationship between presidents Xi Jinping and Donald Trump and attitudes in their respective countries.
To counter China’s increasingly assertive foreign policy, the United States must maintain its leadership role in the Asia Pacific.
The potential for the United States and China to have conflict over trade and foreign investment is now greater, not because of differences in political systems and cultural norms, but because of commonalities in Trump’s and Xi’s personal aspirations.
The 19th Party Congress holds particular consequence for U.S.-China relations. President Trump will make his inaugural visit to the Asia-Pacific region and to China early next month, becoming among the first world leaders to meet with Xi under his new mandate.
At the 19th Party Congress, Xi Jinping explained how China will move to the center to the world stage through modernization. Yet how Xi defines the roles of the state and the market remains unclear.
China has a unique economy where both state and market play an important role. Western observers often misunderstand issues such as China’s growth model, debt problems, and potential housing bubbles.
Comparing Xi Jinping’s report at the 19th Party Congress to earlier such documents provides an excellent indicator of continuities and recent changes in Chinese foreign policy.
As Europe becomes a preferred playing field for Chinese foreign direct investment, leaders of bloc nations have been drawn into a debate on the creation of a long-anticipated screening mechanism.
The upcoming 19th Party Congress and top political appointments will determine what course China will take in the future under President Xi Jinping’s leadership.
It is imperative that the United States not abandon international development out of the mistaken sense that it is removed from America’s core economic, political, and security interests.
Chinese and Russian leaders won’t always agree, but their deepening cooperation and mistrust of the U.S. is here to stay. Unfortunately, American leaders have shown few signs that they know how to navigate this new reality, let alone manage the competition among great powers as non-Western countries grown in stature.
China’s increasingly sophisticated approach to managing and mitigating multiple forms of investment risk shows that its economic role around the world will evolve and perhaps become more conservative over time. Headline pledges of billions of dollars in project finance don’t tell the whole story.
As a nuclear weapon state and an emerging global power, China can and should take steps to respond constructively to the treaty to prohibit nuclear weapons and to help mitigate the growing international division.
Washington and Pyongyang will eventually need to resume direct talks. With neither party ready for that yet, at first secret contacts will have to be organized in third countries. In the meantime, de-escalation is the order of the day, and Russia one of its unlikely brokers.