Carnegie-Tsinghua Center for Global Policy
While China can do more to crack down on trade with North Korea, the United States should work out the North Korea problem in a way that respects both China and its own national security interests.
Meetings between senior U.S. and Chinese officials have exposed the widening expectations gap between the two governments, leading President Trump to take action.
It’s not enough to ask China to pressure Pyongyang to set up a U.S.-North Korea negotiation. China has to be a central part of the negotiation, too.
It is not enough for China and Russia to work to reduce US dominance in “the grand Eurasian chessboard.” They have to work on a new continental order that other countries, not just the two of them, would find an improvement over the current situation.
Panama's decision to establish ties with China heightens risks of diplomatic isolation for Taiwan, but the future of cross-Strait relations highly depends on the upcoming 19th Party Congress.
Whether regulators can succeed in reining in credit creation this time is ultimately a political question, and depends on the central government’s ability to force through necessary reforms.
India’s prolonged quest to join the Shanghai Cooperation Organization brings into sharp relief an enduring tension between competing geopolitical ideas.
Authoritative and non-authoritative Chinese commentaries on the Trump administration’s foreign policy have tended to avoid making hostile remarks in response to some notable U.S. provocations.
In its clumsy attempt to exploit the vulnerabilities of the Sino-Russian axis, the Trump administration misunderstands not only the strength of relations, but also its own desirability as a useful ally.
At the Belt Road Forum in Beijing, Vladimir Putin once again reaffirmed his personal relations with Xi Jinping without getting into economic specifics. But still, the Russian President managed to get special attention. Russia needs to be satisfied with its political gains from the forum.
With the One Belt, One Road (OBOR) Initiative signaling China’s more activist, assertive regional economic development and security policies, the United States must develop a post-TPP strategy to engage with China and the Asia-Pacific region.
China hopes to use three strengths to make the Belt and Road Initiative a success: its large foreign exchange reserves, dominance in certain infrastructure fields, and unique forms of state backed project finance.
By deepening its political, economic and military engagement in Afghanistan, and by formally signing a Memorandum of Understanding in 2016, China seems to be emerging as a long-term player in the region’s new Great Game.
European countries are increasingly more receptive to the Belt and Road Initiative and Chinese investment, but concerns remain over how competition from Chinese firms will impact developed European economies.
China maintains that its Belt and Road Initiative is an economic initiative that will benefit Southeast Asia, but more transparency is needed if its projects are to succeed in the region.
The Belt and Road Initiative is considered Xi Jinping’s most important initiative, reflecting distinct characteristics of his leadership, including his ambition and confidence.
The days of simply sticking a pipe in the ground and tapping a pool of easy-to-handle and profitable crude oil are fading. Changing resources require people challenge conventional thinking on oil.
As tensions between the United States and North Korea continue to simmer, questions arise concerning what war with a nuclear-powered North Korea would look like.
While the EU and the United States have similar barriers to entry, EU investments in China have grown more rapidly.
The common thread in U.S. strategy toward Iran, Syria, and North Korea isn’t changing these regimes so much as it is trying to change their behavior. More than likely, they will all remain hostile to U.S. interests.