China’s development of strategic technologies is increasingly drawing attention from its economic partners. Observers and non-Chinese firms need to understand that China’s interest in strategic technologies has long been a central part of the Chinese policy landscape.
Denuclearization of the North will not be possible to achieve, if it is possible to achieve at all, unless there is a transformational change in North Korea’s relationships with the United States and South Korea.
The primary interest dictating Chinese policy is the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation, which serves as the new principle guiding the relationship between China and the international community.
President Trump has promised to bring jobs and manufacturing back to the United States but his economics policies are in line with those of previous administrations.
What are the outcomes of the dialogue and what are the implications for economic relations between the two countries? Six Scholars from China and the United States give their insights.
Thoughtful and respectful leadership, close consultation with affected parties, and a commitment of real resources to assemble necessary leverage present a better chance than anything on offer so far.
Russia’s relations with China have undergone a complete transformation in the past quarter century and have developed into a genuine strategic partnership, despite the Kremlin’s junior partner status.
Political sensitivities, security concerns, and industrial structure direct the flow of investments.
Reducing America’s persistent trade deficits with China will require addressing thorny structural issues. In the short term, the focus should be on investment-related concerns.
Beijing’s role and response to the current economic crisis engulfing Venezuela needs to be further examined, particularly in light of China’s loans-for-oil relationship with the developing nation.
If anything were needed to underline how much safer the Iran deal has made the United States, the menace of North Korea’s nuclear development surely qualifies.
Meetings between senior U.S. and Chinese officials have exposed the widening expectations gap between the two governments, leading President Trump to take action.
It’s not enough to ask China to pressure Pyongyang to set up a U.S.-North Korea negotiation. China has to be a central part of the negotiation, too.
It is not enough for China and Russia to work to reduce US dominance in “the grand Eurasian chessboard.” They have to work on a new continental order that other countries, not just the two of them, would find an improvement over the current situation.
Panama's decision to establish ties with China heightens risks of diplomatic isolation for Taiwan, but the future of cross-Strait relations highly depends on the upcoming 19th Party Congress.
Whether regulators can succeed in reining in credit creation this time is ultimately a political question, and depends on the central government’s ability to force through necessary reforms.
India’s prolonged quest to join the Shanghai Cooperation Organization brings into sharp relief an enduring tension between competing geopolitical ideas.
Authoritative and non-authoritative Chinese commentaries on the Trump administration’s foreign policy have tended to avoid making hostile remarks in response to some notable U.S. provocations.
In its clumsy attempt to exploit the vulnerabilities of the Sino-Russian axis, the Trump administration misunderstands not only the strength of relations, but also its own desirability as a useful ally.
At the Belt Road Forum in Beijing, Vladimir Putin once again reaffirmed his personal relations with Xi Jinping without getting into economic specifics. But still, the Russian President managed to get special attention. Russia needs to be satisfied with its political gains from the forum.