Authoritative and non-authoritative Chinese commentaries on the Trump administration’s foreign policy have tended to avoid making hostile remarks in response to some notable U.S. provocations.
In its clumsy attempt to exploit the vulnerabilities of the Sino-Russian axis, the Trump administration misunderstands not only the strength of relations, but also its own desirability as a useful ally.
At the Belt Road Forum in Beijing, Vladimir Putin once again reaffirmed his personal relations with Xi Jinping without getting into economic specifics. But still, the Russian President managed to get special attention. Russia needs to be satisfied with its political gains from the forum.
With the One Belt, One Road (OBOR) Initiative signaling China’s more activist, assertive regional economic development and security policies, the United States must develop a post-TPP strategy to engage with China and the Asia-Pacific region.
By deepening its political, economic and military engagement in Afghanistan, and by formally signing a Memorandum of Understanding in 2016, China seems to be emerging as a long-term player in the region’s new Great Game.
European countries are increasingly more receptive to the Belt and Road Initiative and Chinese investment, but concerns remain over how competition from Chinese firms will impact developed European economies.
China maintains that its Belt and Road Initiative is an economic initiative that will benefit Southeast Asia, but more transparency is needed if its projects are to succeed in the region.
The Belt and Road Initiative is considered Xi Jinping’s most important initiative, reflecting distinct characteristics of his leadership, including his ambition and confidence.
The days of simply sticking a pipe in the ground and tapping a pool of easy-to-handle and profitable crude oil are fading. Changing resources require people challenge conventional thinking on oil.
As tensions between the United States and North Korea continue to simmer, questions arise concerning what war with a nuclear-powered North Korea would look like.
While the EU and the United States have similar barriers to entry, EU investments in China have grown more rapidly.
The common thread in U.S. strategy toward Iran, Syria, and North Korea isn’t changing these regimes so much as it is trying to change their behavior. More than likely, they will all remain hostile to U.S. interests.
Because the Indo-Pacific region promises to become the new center of gravity in global politics, its security problems intimately affect the safety, prosperity, and international position of the United States, as well as the wellbeing of its allies.
New Delhi’s current challenge is not about undoing Beijing’s new economic weight in the region. It is about building on its own natural geo-economic advantages in the region.
Increased risk-taking concerning North Korea’s nuclear ambitions could potentially pay off, but there’s a catch.
The Trump administration’s obsession with trade deficits is misguided. Instead, the U.S. focus should be on strengthening investment relations with China.
Without doubt, Asia’s economic ascent has been extraordinary, but Westernization—the spread of the West’s influence and values—has rested on much more than its wealth and the military power derived from it.
Through policy incoherence and not-so-benign neglect, the Trump team risks hollowing out the ideas, initiative, and institutions on which U.S. leadership and international order rest.
International humanitarian law applies only to international and non-international armed conflicts. Most offensive cyber operations to date have not taken place during an armed conflict.
Russian companies are optimistic that the sale of cheap grain and high-quality sweets will help create a climate of “comprehensive strategic cooperation” with China. However, they face completion in the Chinese market from more familiar food brands from the U.S., Australia and New Zealand.