For many years, China has mostly relied on land-based nuclear weapons as its strategic deterrent. But now its fleet of nuclear-armed submarines is getting larger and more advanced. This long-term trend has far-reaching implications.
How China should understand and manage political risk in Venezuela has become one of the most important, if too often ignored, questions not just in China’s relationship with Latin America, but in its broader efforts to be seen as an agent and leader of development on the world stage.
The international community views the Belt and Road through a zero-sum lens. To succeed, Beijing should focus on its domestic aspirations, international responsibilities, and nonmonetary investments.
The Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) was established far earlier than the BRI, and it has become a sophisticated framework for China’s partnerships with African countries. Thus, FOCAC can be a mini-version of multilateral cooperation that aids the implementation of BRI projects.
The international community must design a fair and reasonable North Korea denuclearization road map that is politically sustainable, technically operable, and that can protect the long-term interests of all concerned parties.
China has often been accused of practicing “debt-trap diplomacy”—miring supposed partners, particularly developing countries, in unsustainable debt-based relationships. But this is a misreading of the issue, and nowhere is this more apparent than in China’s dealings with Venezuela.
Chinese experts are increasingly using the term “strategic stability” to refer to a bilateral nuclear relationship of mutual vulnerability. Maintaining such a mutually vulnerable relationship with other major nuclear powers, especially the United States, is of ultimate importance for Chinese decisionmakers.
China and Latin America must confront the legacy of past deals gone wrong and attempt to move beyond commodity-based trade, investment and financing ties to forge more infrastructure cooperation.
China’s and India’s respective military postures, and the perceptions these developments engender on both sides, indicate a path forward. These nuclear rivals should take steps to stabilize their relationship and reduce the chances of conflict.
Despite the pageantry of the Singapore summit, the outcomes remain uncertain.
Whatever the outcome, the June 12 Trump-Kim summit will have major implications for the region’s security landscape.
Concerns about China’s mercantilist trade and investment policies have been at the forefront of growing frictions between China, the EU and the United States, but the Belt and Road Initiative has also highlighted worries about the lending of billions of dollars for infrastructure projects by its “policy banks”.
Since its announcement in 2013, the Belt and Road Initiative has grown from an idea centered on connectivity and infrastructure development into a global strategy bolstering China’s influence and economic diplomacy.
Amid the escalating Sino-U.S. trade friction, Xi’s speech can be seen as creating a mediating space for potential negotiation between Beijing and Washington in order to prevent the global economy from suffering another big blow.
China made clear through Kim’s visit that it will not be sidelined in important conversations and developments on the future of the Korean Peninsula. Now, Xi has had the opportunity to influence the terms of any future agreement.
China and its keenest Latin American borrowers are left with the challenge of managing the legacy of past deals, including those that have gone awry.
It is Trump administration policies and attitudes that have provided China a rhetorical opening in Latin America at a time when China’s economic and political relations with the region face serious challenges.
The draft Nuclear Posture Review of the Donald Trump administration presents Washington's intention to use US nuclear weapons as a hegemonic tool again.
There is a serious risk that North Korea will use renewed dialogue tactically to drive a wedge between Washington and Seoul and to dilute the effects of recently imposed sanctions.
Without a return to genuine bilateralism that takes into account the interests of both parties, Beijing will find that the chasm with New Delhi continues to deepen.