Nuclear weapons and missile defense systems have become a point of contention in U.S.-China relations. How will Beijing respond to the perceived growing threat of U.S. nuclear deterrent capabilities?
While the Trump administration’s nuclear and space policy remains uncertain, drastic readjustments may destabilize China-U.S. relations if China interprets it as a way to contain its rise.
Trump’s engagement in East Asia has further fueled Russian and Chinese perceptions of the U.S. missile defense system as a threat to their nuclear deterrents.
The more realistic option would be increased information sharing between Moscow and Beijing on THAAD and the US military presence in Northeast Asia, as well as joint exercises like the one held in May 2016.
President Trump’s rhetoric on U.S. policy toward China and India present uncertainties for the future of the Indo-Pacific region.
Both the United States and China have to recognize the reality, if not the legitimacy, of each other’s fears about North Korea and make concessions that indicate their good faith in eventually moving toward a Korean Peninsula that is united.
There is no clear, internationally accepted definition of what activities or technologies constitute a nuclear weapons program. This lack of definition encumbers nuclear energy cooperation and complicates peaceful resolution of proliferation disputes.
North Korea has nuclear weapons, something that won’t change anytime soon. As bad as this is, recognizing that status in a way that paves the road for South Korea to follow suit would be even worse.
The recent development and deployment of strategic missile defense systems in the Asia-Pacific have heightened security dilemmas in the region.
With the July 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action diminishing the near-term prospect of an Iranian nuclear bomb, most proliferation prognosticators would likely pick South Korea, Japan, or perhaps Taiwan as the next place that could opt to develop nuclear weapons.