The common thread in U.S. strategy toward Iran, Syria, and North Korea isn’t changing these regimes so much as it is trying to change their behavior. More than likely, they will all remain hostile to U.S. interests.
Because the Indo-Pacific region promises to become the new center of gravity in global politics, its security problems intimately affect the safety, prosperity, and international position of the United States, as well as the wellbeing of its allies.
New Delhi’s current challenge is not about undoing Beijing’s new economic weight in the region. It is about building on its own natural geo-economic advantages in the region.
Increased risk-taking concerning North Korea’s nuclear ambitions could potentially pay off, but there’s a catch.
The Trump administration’s obsession with trade deficits is misguided. Instead, the U.S. focus should be on strengthening investment relations with China.
Without doubt, Asia’s economic ascent has been extraordinary, but Westernization—the spread of the West’s influence and values—has rested on much more than its wealth and the military power derived from it.
Through policy incoherence and not-so-benign neglect, the Trump team risks hollowing out the ideas, initiative, and institutions on which U.S. leadership and international order rest.
International humanitarian law applies only to international and non-international armed conflicts. Most offensive cyber operations to date have not taken place during an armed conflict.
Russian companies are optimistic that the sale of cheap grain and high-quality sweets will help create a climate of “comprehensive strategic cooperation” with China. However, they face completion in the Chinese market from more familiar food brands from the U.S., Australia and New Zealand.
The Trump administration should review the policies behind the U.S. trade deficit with China before deciding on a new course of action.
India is focused on making Bangladesh a centerpiece of its Act East policy.
Sino-Russian relations do not constitute a new axis of like-minded authoritarian regimes that want to challenge the West by default. But it’s an example of how tactical and opportunistic cooperation of non-Western powers seeking to boost their influence on the international stage comes at expense of the Western-led international order.
Donald Trump’s unexpected victory in the 2016 U.S. presidential election has raised profound questions about how the United States and other members of the international community will approach global governance amid a host of transnational challenges.
At a time of critical readjustment, the U.S. and Chinese governments need to establish a solid foundation for the stable development of their bilateral relationship.
Trump’s engagement in East Asia has further fueled Russian and Chinese perceptions of the U.S. missile defense system as a threat to their nuclear deterrents.
The more realistic option would be increased information sharing between Moscow and Beijing on THAAD and the US military presence in Northeast Asia, as well as joint exercises like the one held in May 2016.
Bilateral trade balances alone aren’t an accurate reflection of a country’s economic strength.
The challenge before the United States is to manage, without illusions, a difficult and combative relationship with Russia.
As the North Korean atomic crisis gathers momentum, the Trump administration is suggesting that the option of letting the East Asian allies acquire nuclear options is on the table.
Both the United States and China have to recognize the reality, if not the legitimacy, of each other’s fears about North Korea and make concessions that indicate their good faith in eventually moving toward a Korean Peninsula that is united.