Blaming the undervalued Chinese renminbi for America's economic ills is convenient but counterproductive, given the complicated causes of U.S. trade imbalances.
While Washington shouldn’t alter its general strategy toward Beijing, it should rethink some approaches in order to minimize the chance that the two countries will be drawn into competition for strategic primacy in the Asia-Pacific region.
Far from resolving America's economic woes, targeting China's currency will only result in higher prices for U.S. consumers and reduced global demand.
If economic growth in China—the world’s economic engine—were derailed by a financial, political, social, or international accident, the effect would be much more severe than anything that happens in Greece.
Although tempting in the short run, a sudden influx of foreign capital into the European Union would raise both unemployment and debt without addressing the root of Europe's economic woes.
For the last decade South American exports of mining, agricultural, and energy commodities to China have boomed, leading countries like Argentina, Brazil, and Chile to worry about rising commodity dependency on China.
While assessments of Chinese economic imbalances often rely on flawed statistics that understate consumption and overestimate investment, the country’s share of consumption to GDP will not rise significantly until Beijing increases welfare spending or divests itself of state assets.
As China tries to rebalance its economy, a small but rising number of Chinese economists are beginning to predict sharply lower annual growth rates in the coming years.
While the current U.S. economic tensions are likely to hurt Washington's democracy and human rights agenda as far as Beijing is concerned, they are also likely to help China's international financial situation.
Beijing can learn important lessons from the tragedy on the train tracks in Wenzhou about the management of its rail networks and also the more critical issue of its 2020 nuclear energy goals.
Statistical distortion on the use of coal in China is likely to not only severely undermine Beijing’s energy conservation and carbon abatement policy initiatives, but also make it difficult for the international community to verify achievements claimed by the Chinese government.
China and Russia share significant common ground on a number of issues, but a number of concerns still shape Sino-Russian bilateral relations.
Distorted incentive structures in China are encouraging many Chinese corporations to borrow—and increase their unsustainable level of debt—even though investments are not generating sufficient economic value.
A close comparison of the security perceptions of Chinese and Indian strategic, scientific, and academic experts reveals that the Sino-Indian security dilemma cannot be simply viewed through the prism of the border anymore.
China’s economy can only continue to grow rapidly through ever riskier increases in debt. Eventually, Chinese authorities will either choose to slow growth and curtail investment sharply or they will be forced to do so by their excessive debt.
Rising wages and capital costs are squeezing China's small- and medium-sized enterprises, while administrative attempts to mandate lending through quotas are distorting credit markets.
While strategic stability in China has traditionally reflected a concern for maintaining balance, the discussion has broadened in the past years to include concerns over issues such as nuclear terrorism and disarmament.
Carnegie's Beijing-based associate Lora Saalman speaks at The Asian Institute for Policy Studies' panel, Engaging China and Russia on Nuclear Disarmament.
Despite China's low consumption and high investment relative to GDP, key indicators suggest that its growth is not actually unbalanced.
With the bureaucratic infrastructure for solid bilateral relations between China and Russia already in place, the next step is increased dialogue between the countries’ intellectuals, who can examine the relationship from a broader perspective.