Southeast Asia is often viewed as a dynamic region, home to several of Asia’s tiger economies. But look a bit closer, and the region is replete with internal tensions—some between countries, but most within countries. April’s events in the region are illustrative of so many of these tensions. In every case, they reflect deep fault lines that have existed for many years.
U.S.-China distrust may not be rooted in misunderstanding, but rather in fundamental disagreements over political institutions, value systems, and geostrategic interests.
Chinese National Oil Companies, while owned by the government, increasingly base investment decisions on market signals rather than state orders. Their efforts to access oil and gas resources are helping to meet the challenge of high petroleum consumption levels.
China's diplomatic reforms have not been as prominent as in other sectors over the last three decades of reform and opening-up.
A slimmed down NATO could do a better job of harmonizing transatlantic positions in crisis situations, be the hub of multinational, high-end military operations, and develop expertise and capabilities to deal with new threats such as cyber attacks.
While developing its Asian strategy, Russia will certainly give a lot of attention to cooperation with China, but it will not ignore its interests and opportunities in other countries in the region.
While NATO can extend the status quo in the short term, it cannot postpone resolving its defense and deterrence dilemmas without undermining Alliance confidence and cohesion.
Beijing faces a real challenge in determining how to put both the economic and political China-Latin America relationship on more sustainable, longer-term footing.
Any comparative exercise that contrasts the Chinese model of state–economy relations with that of the United States is inherently political and prone to various angles of critique
With anxieties over the nuclear activities of North Korea and Iran looming large, heads of state from 53 countries convened in Seoul this week to reaffirm and intensify their commitment to prevent nuclear materials from getting into the hands of terrorists.
With advantages in labor, productivity, and geography, China has the potential to displace many Southeast Asian nations from their niche in the global production chain.
The second Nuclear Security Summit in Seoul in March 2012 provides an opportunity for China, Japan, and the Republic of Korea to develop concrete cooperation on nuclear security.
China needs to enact tighter monetary policies in order to raise household consumption and rebalance toward a more sustainable growth model.
The Iranian nuclear crisis and the subsequent pressure that Western nations have been putting on Tehran to curb nuclear ambitions has challenged Chinese diplomacy, encouraging China to redefine its international role.
Mitt Romney's tough talk on China conceals some assumptions that, if translated into policy, could set the two great powers on a collision course.
As China's power continues to grow, Russians need to rediscover themselves as a Euro-Pacific nation and strengthen ties to East Asia in order to avoid becoming Beijing's junior partner.
Despite the overlapping interests of Russia and China, the two countries are not allies. Moscow will not accept a junior position vis-à-vis Beijing, while the Chinese regard Russia as a fading power.
There is a consensus in the international community that while Iran cannot currently build nuclear weapons, if left unregulated, it would eventually succeed in doing so.
Debate in China on Iran’s nuclear program continues to focus on uranium enrichment at the expense of other key aspects that could give a better indication of the broader program’s progress and outcomes.
The nature of the climate challenge in the immediate future will be determined by China and the world’s largest carbon emitters—not U.N. summits.