Sino-Russian relations do not constitute a new axis of like-minded authoritarian regimes that want to challenge the West by default. But it’s an example of how tactical and opportunistic cooperation of non-Western powers seeking to boost their influence on the international stage comes at expense of the Western-led international order.
The more realistic option would be increased information sharing between Moscow and Beijing on THAAD and the US military presence in Northeast Asia, as well as joint exercises like the one held in May 2016.
Bilateral trade balances alone aren’t an accurate reflection of a country’s economic strength.
As the North Korean atomic crisis gathers momentum, the Trump administration is suggesting that the option of letting the East Asian allies acquire nuclear options is on the table.
Both the United States and China have to recognize the reality, if not the legitimacy, of each other’s fears about North Korea and make concessions that indicate their good faith in eventually moving toward a Korean Peninsula that is united.
The international community has finally started a serious conversation about norms in cyberspace. But reaching a global consensus needs the world’s attention.
North Korea has nuclear weapons, something that won’t change anytime soon. As bad as this is, recognizing that status in a way that paves the road for South Korea to follow suit would be even worse.
After five years of consolidating power, Xi Jinping will emerge stronger than ever before. For this year at least, Xi will play the role of global leader, and the world will be better for it.
Both China and the United States need to address shared problems such as moderating rising income disparities, designing effective regulatory systems, and promoting innovation.
Chinese experts say that the country is beginning to take a more proactive approach to foreign affairs, and shifting from a focus of integrating into the international system to shaping it.
A moral realist approach to China’s rise identifies external and internal challenges for an emerging power competing with a dominant state in the international system.
Rather than forging an alliance against the third corner of the triangle, China and Russia should join forces in building a new regional system at the time when the global order is in transition.
Governments need to adapt traditional concepts and tools of statecraft to the digital age.
North Korea test-fired a missile on the morning of February 12, a primary objective of which was to improve the survivability of its nuclear weapons and missiles. But it also seems that North Korea had other goals in mind when testing this new mobilized solid-fuel missile.
Contrasting political systems and cultural norms have always made it difficult for China and the United States to work together. Ironically, with Presidents Trump and Xi, the potential for conflict is now greater not because of these differences but because of commonalities in their aspirations.
U.S.-China relations are at a crossroads as the two countries’ leaders assert each nation’s place as a global leader, but new opportunities for productive engagement may replace growing strategic competition.
With time and the need to accumulate achievements, policy issues will depend less on personalities, though the president’s personality will remain important, than on working with enduring realities.
China’s place in the East Asian production chain distorts trade data to make it seem like the country responsible for the U.S. trade deficit. This is not the case.
The likelihood of North Korean nuclear and missile tests over the next six months is fairly high if the Trump administration continues the Obama administration’s unsuccessful approach of “strategic patience.”
As China continues to grow, reform, invest abroad, and integrate with the global financial system, it is almost inevitable that one day the RMB will rival the U.S. dollar and the Euro as a global reserve currency. But that day is still far away.