While assessments of Chinese economic imbalances often rely on flawed statistics that understate consumption and overestimate investment, the country’s share of consumption to GDP will not rise significantly until Beijing increases welfare spending or divests itself of state assets.
As China tries to rebalance its economy, a small but rising number of Chinese economists are beginning to predict sharply lower annual growth rates in the coming years.
While the current U.S. economic tensions are likely to hurt Washington's democracy and human rights agenda as far as Beijing is concerned, they are also likely to help China's international financial situation.
Beijing can learn important lessons from the tragedy on the train tracks in Wenzhou about the management of its rail networks and also the more critical issue of its 2020 nuclear energy goals.
China and Russia share significant common ground on a number of issues, but a number of concerns still shape Sino-Russian bilateral relations.
Distorted incentive structures in China are encouraging many Chinese corporations to borrow—and increase their unsustainable level of debt—even though investments are not generating sufficient economic value.
A close comparison of the security perceptions of Chinese and Indian strategic, scientific, and academic experts reveals that the Sino-Indian security dilemma cannot be simply viewed through the prism of the border anymore.
China’s economy can only continue to grow rapidly through ever riskier increases in debt. Eventually, Chinese authorities will either choose to slow growth and curtail investment sharply or they will be forced to do so by their excessive debt.
Rising wages and capital costs are squeezing China's small- and medium-sized enterprises, while administrative attempts to mandate lending through quotas are distorting credit markets.
Despite China's low consumption and high investment relative to GDP, key indicators suggest that its growth is not actually unbalanced.
With the bureaucratic infrastructure for solid bilateral relations between China and Russia already in place, the next step is increased dialogue between the countries’ intellectuals, who can examine the relationship from a broader perspective.
Although Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa enjoy significantly more power individually nowadays, as a group they still haven't mastered the methods for transforming their newfound economic prowess into global power.
In spite of nominal changes in the value of China’s currency and domestic interest rates and wages, China’s economy remains unbalanced, as real interest rates continue to outpace real wages and any real appreciation of the renminbi.
In order to reduce rural-urban inequality and prevent widespread unrest, China needs to invest its citizens with greater mobility and property rights by reforming its system for household registration.
If China is to avoid accumulating unsustainable levels of debt, it must reform its banking system by lowering interest rates, improving corporate governance, ensuring a more predictable regulatory framework, and providing higher quality information to investors.
If the Chinese and U.S. militaries cannot commit to a cooperative relationship, progress between the two nations on strategic issues will be limited, hostility could grow, and both sides could become more resolute about defending their respective military objectives.
China’s domestic development drive has prompted it to develop trade relations with Latin America. While generating positive economic results for both sides in the short-term, the threat of Latin America once again falling into a pattern of export dependency—this time with China—looms large.
Beijing's usage of the term "core interests" to describe its critical national priorities indicates that while China has become increasingly assertive on the global stage, the nature and direction of this assertiveness is still being worked out by Chinese leaders.