In threatening to restrict the export of rare earth metals to the United States, China wants to demonstrate that it has leverage over the United States and an ability to respond with commensurate countermeasures if the need arises.
It is far too early to declare the “death” of the Belt and Road Initiative. Such assessments are premature, and fail to recognize the importance of the BRI to the leadership in Beijing.
Despite the established comprehensive strategic partnership between China and the EU, mutual trust is still lacking.
President Trump believes he is entering the Hanoi summit having achieved a number of milestones in his “historic push for peace on the Korean Peninsula.” However, this ignores his failure to advance the core issue of denuclearization.
Beijing has long been concerned about its exposure to Venezuela’s slow-motion descent into crisis. There’s also a broader story about China’s efforts to promote itself as a leader of international development and South-South ties.
In the midst of increasingly competitive and near-confrontational relations, it is important to remain clear-eyed about the difficulties that the United States and China face going forward.
How China should understand and manage political risk in Venezuela has become one of the most important, if too often ignored, questions not just in China’s relationship with Latin America, but in its broader efforts to be seen as an agent and leader of development on the world stage.
The Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) was established far earlier than the BRI, and it has become a sophisticated framework for China’s partnerships with African countries. Thus, FOCAC can be a mini-version of multilateral cooperation that aids the implementation of BRI projects.
The international community must design a fair and reasonable North Korea denuclearization road map that is politically sustainable, technically operable, and that can protect the long-term interests of all concerned parties.
China has often been accused of practicing “debt-trap diplomacy”—miring supposed partners, particularly developing countries, in unsustainable debt-based relationships. But this is a misreading of the issue, and nowhere is this more apparent than in China’s dealings with Venezuela.
China and Latin America must confront the legacy of past deals gone wrong and attempt to move beyond commodity-based trade, investment and financing ties to forge more infrastructure cooperation.
Since its announcement in 2013, the Belt and Road Initiative has grown from an idea centered on connectivity and infrastructure development into a global strategy bolstering China’s influence and economic diplomacy.
Amid the escalating Sino-U.S. trade friction, Xi’s speech can be seen as creating a mediating space for potential negotiation between Beijing and Washington in order to prevent the global economy from suffering another big blow.
China made clear through Kim’s visit that it will not be sidelined in important conversations and developments on the future of the Korean Peninsula. Now, Xi has had the opportunity to influence the terms of any future agreement.
China and its keenest Latin American borrowers are left with the challenge of managing the legacy of past deals, including those that have gone awry.
It is Trump administration policies and attitudes that have provided China a rhetorical opening in Latin America at a time when China’s economic and political relations with the region face serious challenges.
The draft Nuclear Posture Review of the Donald Trump administration presents Washington's intention to use US nuclear weapons as a hegemonic tool again.
There is a serious risk that North Korea will use renewed dialogue tactically to drive a wedge between Washington and Seoul and to dilute the effects of recently imposed sanctions.
Without a return to genuine bilateralism that takes into account the interests of both parties, Beijing will find that the chasm with New Delhi continues to deepen.
On the North Korea nuclear threat, global leaders have an obligation not to avoid reality.