What are Chinese “red lines” when it comes to the Korean Peninsula? What further actions by Pyongyang might lead China to fundamentally shift its approach to one that involves more comprehensive pressure and sanctions, such as a complete oil embargo? In this podcast, Dr. Tong Zhao, a fellow in Carnegie’s Nuclear Policy Program based at the Carnegie–Tsinghua Center for Global Policy, tells Paul Haenle that while the sixth nuclear test did not cross a Chinese “red line”, there are actions North Korea could take that would do so.
Most notably, if North Korea were to launch a nuclear warhead and detonate it over the Pacific Ocean, that would cross Beijing’s “red line” and lead to a significantly harsher stance towards the regime, Zhao argued. This is especially alarming given statements by North Korea’s Foreign Minister, Ri Yong Ho, on September 22nd, that indicated North Korea may be preparing to do just that.
Paul Haenle
Paul Haenle is the director of the Carnegie–Tsinghua Center for Global Policy based at Tsinghua University in Beijing.
Tong Zhao
Tong Zhao is a fellow in Carnegie’s Nuclear Policy Program based at the Carnegie–Tsinghua Center for Global Policy.
Comments(1)
This was one of the best discussions of the dynamic between the US and China with respect to the ongoing development of nuclear weapons by N. Korea. Contrary to the simplistic presentation of China's interest that generally comes through the US press, Paul Haenle and Tong Zhou lay out markers that may cause China to take a more assertive role towards N. Korea, while also highlighting that Chinese and US perspectives and interest differ in some fundamental ways. N. Korea's announced today that the US has effectively 'declared war' and N. Korea has also indicated that it considers it has the right to shoot down US aircraft. The situation continues to escalate and unless there is some opening to dialogue it looks more likely now that some military engagement will take place. Tong Zhao explains why even stronger sanctions by China would be unlikely to stop the completion of N. Korea's nuclear development plans, and suggests that we will need to learn to live with a nuclear N. Korea. At the same time, China is more concerned about the possibility of N. Korean aggression towards China. It would be interesting to learn more about how China would see living with a nuclear N. Korea and what the implications would be for the Chinese-N. Korean trade and economic relations. Would nuclear capability effectively lock China into an economic bargain with N. Korea where it would have little bargaining power if the threat of use of nuclear weapons were omnipresent? How would China approach the question of policy and management of nuclear weapons in N. Korea? How would China see the implications of nuclear expansion in the rest of Asia as a consequence? Thanks for this excellent discussion and I look forward to continued exploration of this issue at the Center.
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