The international debate about nuclear risk has catalogued many different kinds of risk and danger. But two stand out as especially salient: the risk of the nuclear arms race and the risk of employment of nuclear weapons arising out of a conventional conflict.
China once had the smallest nuclear arsenal of the five nuclear powers. But to ensure the effectiveness of its deterrence in a complex security environment, it has made steady efforts to modernize its arsenal.
The success of China’s regional outreach in Latin America will depend, as it has for a number of years, on Beijing’s relative influence in regional institutions and on the capacity and effectiveness of the institutions themselves.
The Trump administration holds a decidedly critical view of China’s infrastructure initiatives in Pakistan. Although there is much to criticize in the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, the administration’s fixation on commercial and economic issues threatens to distract U.S. policymakers from deeper concerns.
The far-reaching political and economic impacts of pandemics warrant security coordination on par with that of military threats.
A major reason for the quick spread of the coronavirus is the lack of orchestration in the international effort to contain it. Currently, protection and monitoring measures are decided by authorities in different countries, whose standards and levels of implementation vary.
The Nuclear Weapons States (NWS) are under-utilizing the P5 Process, endangering global efforts to promote disarmament through transparency and confidence-building measures. If reinvigorated, however, the Process has the potential to make greater contributions to arms control.
India manages a delicate balancing act between the United States and China, but in several key areas, the three giants could advance shared interests.
As North Korea continues to stall talks with the United States and South Korea, there is a greater need for China to play a more assertive role to help break the impasse.
The world’s two largest economies are locked in competition. What drives their different narratives, and how should they avoid a larger confrontation?
Japan and South Korea appear poised to let thorny political disagreements torpedo intelligence swapping on North Korea’s nukes and missiles. That would leave both countries and the United States all worse off and have broader regional security implications.
Chinese President Xi Jinping and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi are meeting on October 11, 2019. The summit in Mamallapuram, India, is a chance to work through the recent strains in the two countries’ relationship.
China’s economy faces uncertainty and choppy waters in the years ahead, a trend that the trade conflict with the United States seems likely to deepen.
Since the founding of the People’s Republic of China, the relationship between the two superpowers has been transformed.
How has Beijing’s approach to multilateral institutions evolved in the seventy years since the founding of the People’s Republic of China?
Historically, China has forged its own distinctive foreign aid practices. In March 2018, Beijing established the China International Development Cooperation Agency (CIDCA) to integrate and streamline its development aid programs.
The CIDCA’s highly ambitious agenda is a clear sign that, after years of considerable growth in China’s development finance, the underlying bureaucratic system is now beginning to mature. Yet key questions remain unanswered.
The narrative that China is engaging in problematic debt trap diplomacy has taken off. But for Sri Lanka and most of China’s other Belt and Road Initiative partners, it is important to understand the history and politics of their relations with Beijing and project selection.
In threatening to restrict the export of rare earth metals to the United States, China wants to demonstrate that it has leverage over the United States and an ability to respond with commensurate countermeasures if the need arises.
The China International Development Cooperation Agency has been tasked with lofty goals, but near-term expectations must be tempered by lingering questions about how it fits into the country’s existing foreign aid bureaucracy.