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This article distills several potential principles for Beijing to adopt in its competition with the United States, including two each in the following three areas: Marxism, traditional Chinese culture, and China’s historical experiences since 1949.
As China’s engagement with African countries has grown over the past several years, Beijing is increasingly turning to security contractors to protect its Belt and Road Initiative projects, citizens, and diplomats.
Two experts, one Chinese one American, weigh in on the TikTok and WeChat ban. This high-stakes contest reflects a wider technological decoupling that could splinter the internet
Supporters of nuclear expansion believe that a larger Chinese nuclear arsenal is the key to prevent a war with Washington and “nothing else could work.” The overt nature of the debate is unprecedented and shifts public opinion toward greater enthusiasm for a more robust nuclear posture.
To better understand the prospects for U.S.-China arms control, The Diplomat’s senior editor, Ankit Panda, spoke to Tong Zhao, a senior fellow in the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, based at the Carnegie-Tsinghua Center for Global Policy in Beijing.
If China and the United States can dispel some misperceptions on their dispute over missile defense, it could help forestall a costly, ill-timed nuclear arms race.
The current status quo over the Korean Peninsula is not sustainable, as North Korea faces growing economic stress and may become more desperate to shake off the external constraints.
The international debate about nuclear risk has catalogued many different kinds of risk and danger. But two stand out as especially salient: the risk of the nuclear arms race and the risk of employment of nuclear weapons arising out of a conventional conflict.
China once had the smallest nuclear arsenal of the five nuclear powers. But to ensure the effectiveness of its deterrence in a complex security environment, it has made steady efforts to modernize its arsenal.
The success of China’s regional outreach in Latin America will depend, as it has for a number of years, on Beijing’s relative influence in regional institutions and on the capacity and effectiveness of the institutions themselves.
The Trump administration holds a decidedly critical view of China’s infrastructure initiatives in Pakistan. Although there is much to criticize in the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, the administration’s fixation on commercial and economic issues threatens to distract U.S. policymakers from deeper concerns.
The far-reaching political and economic impacts of pandemics warrant security coordination on par with that of military threats.
A major reason for the quick spread of the coronavirus is the lack of orchestration in the international effort to contain it. Currently, protection and monitoring measures are decided by authorities in different countries, whose standards and levels of implementation vary.
The Nuclear Weapons States (NWS) are under-utilizing the P5 Process, endangering global efforts to promote disarmament through transparency and confidence-building measures. If reinvigorated, however, the Process has the potential to make greater contributions to arms control.
India manages a delicate balancing act between the United States and China, but in several key areas, the three giants could advance shared interests.
As North Korea continues to stall talks with the United States and South Korea, there is a greater need for China to play a more assertive role to help break the impasse.
The world’s two largest economies are locked in competition. What drives their different narratives, and how should they avoid a larger confrontation?
Japan and South Korea appear poised to let thorny political disagreements torpedo intelligence swapping on North Korea’s nukes and missiles. That would leave both countries and the United States all worse off and have broader regional security implications.
Chinese President Xi Jinping and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi are meeting on October 11, 2019. The summit in Mamallapuram, India, is a chance to work through the recent strains in the two countries’ relationship.
China’s economy faces uncertainty and choppy waters in the years ahead, a trend that the trade conflict with the United States seems likely to deepen.