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Effective nuclear arms control engagement with China will likely require confidence-building measures by the United States and greater support from the international community.
Two experts, one Chinese one American, weigh in on the TikTok and WeChat ban. This high-stakes contest reflects a wider technological decoupling that could splinter the internet
Supporters of nuclear expansion believe that a larger Chinese nuclear arsenal is the key to prevent a war with Washington and “nothing else could work.” The overt nature of the debate is unprecedented and shifts public opinion toward greater enthusiasm for a more robust nuclear posture.
To better understand the prospects for U.S.-China arms control, The Diplomat’s senior editor, Ankit Panda, spoke to Tong Zhao, a senior fellow in the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, based at the Carnegie-Tsinghua Center for Global Policy in Beijing.
If China and the United States can dispel some misperceptions on their dispute over missile defense, it could help forestall a costly, ill-timed nuclear arms race.
The current status quo over the Korean Peninsula is not sustainable, as North Korea faces growing economic stress and may become more desperate to shake off the external constraints.
The international debate about nuclear risk has catalogued many different kinds of risk and danger. But two stand out as especially salient: the risk of the nuclear arms race and the risk of employment of nuclear weapons arising out of a conventional conflict.
China once had the smallest nuclear arsenal of the five nuclear powers. But to ensure the effectiveness of its deterrence in a complex security environment, it has made steady efforts to modernize its arsenal.
China and Pakistan should strive to build a RMB closed-chain cycle based on capital exports and trade returns.
The success of China’s regional outreach in Latin America will depend, as it has for a number of years, on Beijing’s relative influence in regional institutions and on the capacity and effectiveness of the institutions themselves.