A competitive power dynamic has emerged in the Asian maritime domain as China’s rising naval power meets the U.S. policy of maintaining its power projection capacity. Tensions have also arisen between China and other states in the region over overlapping sovereignty claims in the South and East China Seas. These dynamics make cooperation among the regional powers on common interests more difficult but also more critical for regional and global security.

The Carnegie-Tsinghua Center and the Institute for Asia Pacific Studies held a conference on East Asia maritime issues. For the fourth session, which focused on areas of conflict and cooperation among China, Japan, and the United States, participants included Admiral Kazumine Akimoto of Japan, Gao Lan of the Institute of Asia Pacific Studies, U.S. Admiral Eric McVaden, Jiao Shixin of the Institute of Asia Pacific Studies, and other experts. Princeton professor and former U.S. official Tom Christensen moderated.

The Regional Balance of Power

  • U.S. Maritime Strategy: As the dominant naval power in East Asia, the United States  and its allies have maintained freedom of navigation and other public goods. The United States seeks to maintain the ability to project its power in the region and to prevent China from having the capacity to deny the United States that ability. Chinese participants saw the U.S. determination to remain the dominant regional military force as related to but distinct from its commitment to freedom of navigation.
     
  • U.S. Strategy and ASEAN: Jiao stated that President Obama’s “return to Asia” marked a change in U.S. policy in the region. He argued that Washington is building partnerships with the ASEAN countries in order to recover lost influence, benefit from their economic growth, maintain air dominance to keep watch on China, and take advantage of territorial disputes between China and its neighbors. Christensen argued there was no policy change as the United States had “never left Asia,” adding that the United States supports China’s rise.
     
  • Chinese Maritime Strategy: Under China’s “9-dash” line, all of the South China Sea would be a Chinese exclusive economic zone (EEZ. As China’s maritime forces, and therefore its capacity to act on its claims, have expanded, there is increasing concern among other Asian nations. The United States and other countries believe that China is modernizing its navy to enable it to carry out an Anti-Access/Access Denial (A2/AD) strategy in the South China Sea. Admiral Yang Yi of the PLA Navy stated that China would only apply its A2/AD capacity to a conflict in the Taiwan Straits and that the United States had misinterpreted China’s purposes.
     
  • Conflict Improbable Despite Competition: Several participants expressed their view that despite the competitive dynamic in the maritime domain, there will be no military confrontation between the United States, Japan, and China. Chinese and Japanese participants expressed their belief that the economic cost of such a confrontation would be so unbearable as to preclude its occurring.

Sovereignty Claims in the Near Seas

China’s disputes with neighboring states concerning territorial claims in the near seas have escalated recently, as has Chinese concern over U.S. involvement in the disputes.

  • China’s Disputes: China claims sovereignty over all the islands within the “9-dash line,” encompassing most of the near seas. Some of these islands are also claimed by ASEAN countries, and the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands are also claimed by Japan. Disputes have escalated in recent years as the implementation of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and China’s rising maritime power caused China and the other claimant states to promote their claims through statements and development policies. China asserts that its 9-dash line claim dates back to the 1940s, predating UNCLOS, but other countries disagree.
     
  • The Role of the United States: Chinese scholars stated that the United States had recently altered its policy by deciding to involve itself China’s territorial disputes. One Chinese scholar described the United States as “breaking its silence” on the Diaoyu island issue by stating the U.S.-Japan security treaty applied to the islands and conducting multilateral military exercises in the near seas. American participants stated that the exercises in question were not related to Diaoyu and that there had been no U.S. policy change because the United States had always held the security treaty applied to territory claimed by Japan.

Opportunities for Cooperation

Participants noted opportunities for cooperation among the regional powers and emphasized the importance of such cooperation for regional and global peace and security.

  • Areas for Cooperation: The U.S., Japanese, and Chinese navies are all becoming more modern and powerful, but none can provide regional security goods alone, agreed the participants. They saw opportunities for bilateral and multilateral cooperation to provide commercial maritime security, combat non-traditional security threats, and provide humanitarian or disaster relief.
     
  • Mechanisms of Cooperation: McVaden argued that Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi’s 2005 initiative for regional cooperation to combat piracy and the existing Global Military Force proposal could be combined to enhance trust and cooperation among nations. Other U.S. and Chinese participants stated that building blocks like the U.S.-China Strategic Economic Dialogue officer-to-officer cooperation must precede large-scale cooperation. They emphasized the need for increased transparency. One Chinese scholar proposed that China take the first step by pledging not to use force to resolve territorial disputes or interfere with free navigation.
     
  • Impediments to Cooperation: American participants stated that China’s use of fishing vessels to pursue its territorial policies in the near seas undermines the potential for cooperation by making it difficult to have officer-to-officer exchanges. They also emphasized that China’s policy of breaking off talks as retaliation undermined cooperation because institutions are brittle and difficult to restart. Chinese perceptions of the United States as interfering in its territorial disputes may also make cooperation more difficult, Chinese participants added.