The world’s largest international maritime exercise, the 2014 Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) exercise, is taking place from June 26 to August 1, 2014. Twenty-three countries are participating, including the United States, Japan, Australia, and, for the first time, China.
China and the United States need a rich, intensive, strategic conversation to reach a better understanding of how they can cooperate in areas of common interest and manage successfully the differences that inevitably arise in the relations between major states.
The past two decades of Chinese growth have disproportionately benefited a small elite that has become increasingly entrenched; the next stage must focus on liberal reforms to build social capital more broadly.
While China has great ambitions in clean energy, the country is still a long way off from transitioning the majority of its power source to renewables.
The latest World Bank report predicts China will likely surpass the United States as the world’s largest economy in 2014. This report underscores the contradiction in China’s identity as a developing country.
China is unusually secure in its policy of nonintervention in the Syrian conflict. But will strong rhetoric and vetoes be enough?
Myanmar’s government needs a reform strategy that supports the financial sector’s rapid development while ensuring its stability, efficiency, and accessibility.
The BRICS group is important to China because it is the rising power’s first successful effort to build its own global network with powerful non-Western countries.
The Sino-Russian gas deal emphasizes and accelerates the fading of Russia’s until-now special relationship with the EU. The partnership between Russia and China is acquiring truly strategic depth.
As different as their economic and political systems are, China and India have much more to learn from each other’s success, and much more to gain together, in securing their shared critical sea lanes and energy supply.
Russia should not treat the post-2014 situation in Afghanistan as a potential disaster for its security in the south. Nevertheless, the coalition withdrawal from Afghanistan will force Russia to take more responsibility for regional security.
The availability, access, and affordability of Indian energy faces an increasing risk from four formidable barriers: energy subsidies, systemic management inefficiencies, competition from a resource-hungry China, and climate change.
Vladimir Putin’s first visit outside the former Soviet Union since the beginning of the Ukraine crisis is to China. The vector of Russian foreign policy has changed dramatically, and Russia has been seeking ways to strengthen ties with leading non-Western powers.
The Obama administration’s pivot to Asia has not emboldened America’s regional partners, nor has U.S. reluctance to directly intervene in territorial disputes signaled waning support for U.S. allies.
The concept of “conflict control” should play a key role in bilateral relations at a time when China’s rise is driving a sea change in the world order.
China has a nearly insatiable thirst for energy. The investments and oils pursued to meet this demand will have global economic, environmental, and security implications.
The United States has spent $1 billion on a weapon that has no mission and has started an arms race with China in the process.
Manufacturing costs in China have dropped sharply in recent months. Instead of just trying to undercut other suppliers on price, Chinese manufacturers ought to invest the surplus in building more meaningful relationships with their Western customers and creating value that can only come from such ties.
Adjusting GDP for differences in purchasing power makes a great deal of sense in certain cases, but the way it is done is so filled with problems that it is extremely difficult to find any economist who takes these measures very seriously.
The idea that the United States at some point left Asia and only now is pivoting back to it under President Obama is inaccurate and unhelpful.